Secure drone communication: an absolute must for a reliable UAV deployment

The use of drones is rapidly growing in many sectors, from agriculture and inspection to defense and logistics. But this growth is also bringing serious risks. In 2025, IATA reported a staggering 500% increase in GPS spoofing incidents compared to 2022 (‘IATA Reports 500% Spike In GPS Spoofing Last Year’ in Simple Flying, 2024). Drones going off course, landing automatically or even crashing due to sabotaged signals: none of this is any longer a future scenario but rather a reality here and now. Through the discussion of practical examples and an in-depth technical investigation of the MAVLink protocol, this article outlines how vulnerable current systems are and which measures are effective against modern attacks.

In conflict areas like Ukraine, GPS manipulation and signal jamming are actively being used as tactics in electronic warfare. As a result, drones lose their way or crash. In Kyiv, civilians reported that their phones suddenly thought they were in Russia as a result of intensive anti-drone spoofing measures (‘The Ukrainian military’s anti-drone GPS spoofing spills into civilians’ phones’ in The Record, 2024). Furthermore, pilots flying over Europe reported massive disruptions in their navigation equipment, leading to dangerous situations (‘GPS Spoofing Is Now Affecting Airplanes In Parts Of Europe’ in Forbes, 2024). These incidents demonstrate that even advanced drones remain vulnerable if communication is not secure enough. For a concrete investigation of this problem, we conducted a technical analysis of the MAVLink protocol, of which the setup and findings are shared in this blog post, which also sets out the measures that were proven to be effective against modern attack techniques.

The MAVLink protocol is an open-source standard used to control drones and exchange data with ground stations. Due to its broad application, from hobby drones to professional platforms, the security of this protocol is a critical factor for reliable drone operations. In our research, we specifically focused on MAVLink version 2 to analyze the extent to which security improvements is able to withstand attacks such as eavesdropping, spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks (DoS).

Previous studies on version 1 of the protocol (‘MAVLink Protocol: A Survey of Security Threats and Countermeasures’ in ResearchGate, 2024) have shown that the protocol is vulnerable to various attacks, such as eavesdropping and denial-of-service attacks. Afterwards, a second version of MAVLink was released, implementing security measures such as message signing, which enables systems to verify whether messages come from a trusted source. Because of this development, it was essential to identify risks in the second version of the protocol as well. In this blog, we delve deeper into the vulnerabilities of MAVLink version 2 and outline why it is important to better secure such communication protocols.

We conducted research on the second version of the MAVLink protocol. During this research, various attack techniques were performed on both a simulated drone infrastructure and a real drone infrastructure. This research revealed several vulnerabilities and demonstrated the impact of unsecured communication channels.

Phase 1: In the first research phase, multiple successful attacks were carried out on a simulated drone infrastructure. These attacks included:

• Denial-of-service attacks (DoS attacks)
• Eavesdropping
• Ground control station spoofing (GCS spoofing)

The results showed that a breach of the communication channels could lead to a loss of control over the drone and leakage of sensitive information, such as GPS coordinates.

Phase 2: In the second research phase, the same attack techniques as in phase 1 were applied to a real drone infrastructure using the MAVLink protocol. Although eavesdropping was still possible, the results showed that security measures had improved. Denial-of-service attacks had a more limited impact, and GCS spoofing was no longer successful. This phase clearly shows that small adjustments can influence the options an attacker has. Since MAVLink is an open-source protocol, manufacturers can freely adapt it to their own hardware, software and communication structure. This means that standard attack strategies that work on a ‘bare’ MAVLink implementation are not always successful when the protocol has been slightly modified. Consider, for example:

• Custom message formats or command IDs: if a manufacturer changes the structure of certain messages or adds unique formatting, a standard tool or script that normally analyzes or falsifies MAVLink messages may no longer function correctly.
• Changed timing or authentication checks: by making small changes in timing (such as the frequency of heartbeat signals) or incorporating checks in the GCS (ground control station), spoofing attacks can become less effective.
• Proprietary encryption or authentication layer on top of MAVLink: some manufacturers build an extra security layer on top of the protocol (e.g., symmetric encryption or message signing). As a result, messages are sent encrypted, and eavesdropping or injection attacks cannot be easily carried out without having the keys.

These relatively small technical adjustments ensure that an attacker has to make more of an effort to successfully attack the system. It makes an attack dependent on the precise implementation and requires more customization and preparation.

To address the aforementioned vulnerabilities and reduce the impact of unsecured communication channels, manufacturers can consider the following measures:

• Encryption of communication channels: implement strong encryption methods to prevent malicious actors from easily intercepting sensitive information during communication between the drone and the ground control station. For example, it is recommended to use end-to-end encryption to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data. This can help in preventing eavesdropping attacks.
• Implementation of authentication protocols: add strict authentication protocols to ensure that communication between the drone and the GCS only takes place between the drone and the actual GCS. This reduces the risk of attacks such as GCS spoofing.
• DoS protection: implement techniques such as network filters and rate limiting, which limit the number and frequency of incoming connections. Additionally, fail-safe mechanisms can ensure that drones and ground control stations continue to function safely even during temporary disruptions. Redundancy in communication channels and the use of distributed networks can further reduce the impact of a DoS attack by providing alternative routes for data transmission. Distributed networks are network structures where information processing and communication take place across multiple devices or nodes, rather than by relying on a single, central location. This ensures a greater resilience since the network continues to function even if a part of it suffers an attack or fails. In the event of a DoS attack, distributed networks offer alternative paths for data traffic, allowing data to still reach its destination through other, non-attacked parts of the network. This reduces the impact of the attack.

Our research into the security of the MAVLink protocol indicate that standard implementations contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers. At the same time, our analysis shows that small, targeted adjustments in protocol logic and the implementation can significantly improve the resilience against attacks such as spoofing and DoS. By applying security measures such as encryption of communication, strict authentication, and robust DoS protection, drone manufacturers can reduce the vulnerability of their systems. Such a reduced susceptibility to cyberattacks would also support a more reliable deployment in various drone applications.

For more information, please contact the Blue Hat Hackers mailbox.