AG opinion on loss‑making non‑resident shareholder receiving dividends subject to WHT
On June 18, 2026, Advocate General (AG) Richard de la Tour of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered an opinion in case C‑241/25. The case deals with whether EU law precludes a Member State from requiring a non‑resident company receiving dividends subject to withholding tax to determine its tax loss in accordance with the tax rules of that Member State, in order to benefit from the same tax treatment as a resident loss‑making company receiving dividends.
Under the Swedish law applicable at the time of the proceedings, dividends distributed by Swedish companies to non‑resident legal entities were subject to withholding tax, with refunds available only in limited circumstances. Since January 1, 2020, non‑resident companies established in the EU may obtain a deferral of the dividend tax where they have incurred a loss calculated in accordance with Swedish tax rules.
The plaintiff, a French company belonging to a French tax consolidated group, received dividends from Swedish companies in 2012. Swedish withholding tax was levied on those dividend payments. The plaintiff subsequently sought a refund of the withholding tax, arguing that the tax constituted a restriction on the free movement of capital under Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The plaintiff argued that it was in a loss-making position and that, in comparable circumstances, a loss-making Swedish resident company would not have been subject to tax on such dividends. The Swedish tax authorities rejected the application. That decision was subsequently upheld by the national courts, which found that the documentation provided by the French company was insufficient to demonstrate, with the necessary degree of certainty, that it had incurred a loss in the relevant year. In their view, such assessment could only be made on the basis of a detailed calculation of both the company’s and the group’s profits and losses under Swedish tax rules.
In the appeal proceedings, Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen (the Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden) referred questions to the CJEU on whether Article 63 TFEU permits:
- requiring a non-resident company to recalculate its profit or loss under the source State’s tax rules;
- taking into account the results of the company's tax group when assessing whether it is loss-making; and
- applying such an approach where the source State itself does not operate a consolidated tax group regime.
The AG started by recalling the guidance that can be derived from the CJEU decisions in case C-575/17 (please refer to Euro Tax Flash Issue 386) and C‑601/23 (please refer to Euro Tax Flash Issue 561). In both cases, the Court found that legislation similar to the one in Sweden represented a restriction on the free movement of capital. The CJEU also rejected pleas brought by several Member States that the situations of resident and non-resident loss-making companies were not objectively comparable. Specifically, in case C-575/17 the Court held that once a Member State, either unilaterally or by way of a convention, levies a tax from both resident and non-resident taxpayers on the income from dividends received from a resident company, the situation of those non-resident taxpayers becomes comparable to that of resident taxpayers. The Court reconfirmed this approach in C‑601/23 and rejected the arguments based on principle of territoriality, as well as those related to inconsistency with previous case-law1 brought by Spain and Germany. The CJEU also rejected justifications based on the need for a balanced allocation of taxing powers and the effectiveness of tax collection.
With respect to the case at hand, the AG reiterated that the withholding tax regime under dispute places non-resident companies at a disadvantage compared to resident loss-making companies, which benefit from a tax deferral or exemption. This difference in treatment represents a restriction on the free movement of capital.
The AG then recalled that it is settled case-law that a difference in treatment is only compatible with the free movement of capital where it concerns situations that are not objectively comparable or where it can be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest. In this context, the AG noted that the case under dispute provides an opportunity for the Court to confirm its reasoning in cases C-575/17 and C‑601/23. The AG referred to the German Government's criticism, supported by Spain, that resident and non-resident entities are not objectively comparable as regards the treatment of losses incurred outside the source State2.The German Government further argued that the Court's case-law above is difficult to reconcile with earlier Grand Chamber judgments endorsing the principle of territoriality. Nevertheless, the AG rejected those arguments and disagreed that the case-law relied on by Germany called into question the conclusions reached in the cases C‑575/17 and C‑601/23. First, the AG noted that the territoriality case-law cited by the German Government concerns situations involving genuine economic activity in the source State, whereas the cases C‑575/17 and C‑601/23 concerned passive income. Second, the AG emphasized that the earlier cases dealt with the determination of the tax base, whereas cases C‑575/17 and C‑601/23 concern the timing of tax payment or reimbursement. Accordingly, the AG concluded that the two lines of case-law address different fact patterns and are not contradictory.
Having found that that the rules under dispute represent a restriction on the free movement of capital with respect to objectively comparable situations, the AG analyzed and rejected the justifications brought forward by several Member States, including those based on the balanced allocation of taxing rights and fiscal cohesion.
With respect to Sweden’s plea that the rules under dispute were justified by the need to fight against tax avoidance (risk of shifting shares to a loss-making non-resident), the AG recalled that whilst combating abuse is a legitimate objective, the measures need to be proportionate. In the case at hand, the AG found that the requirement to compute losses under Swedish law is disproportionate to the objective pursued because it is based on a general presumption of fraud and not on evidence suggesting that fraud or an artificial arrangement intended to avoid payment of dividend tax is at issue. Moreover, in the AG’s view, it imposes heavy administrative burdens, where the cost of that burden could exceed the amount of tax in question, especially for companies investing in several Member States. The AG took the view that accepting proof of losses under the law of the state of residence, combined with administrative cooperation under Directive 2011/16/EU, would be sufficient to achieve the objective of combating tax evasion and tax avoidance.
Regarding the risk of double use of losses (raised by the German Government), non-resident companies must provide relevant evidence enabling the source state’s tax authorities to verify that the conditions for deferral of taxation are fulfilled. The AG recalled that this has already been confirmed by the Court in case C‑601/23.
In light of these considerations, the AG proposed that the CJEU answer that Article 63 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which a non‑resident company receiving dividends subject to withholding tax must calculate its loss in accordance with the tax rules of the source State in order to benefit from the same treatment as that available to resident companies in a comparable situation.
AG opinion on whether Luxembourg correctly transposed the interest limitation rules under the ATAD
On June 18, 2026, AG Juliane Kokott of the CJEU recommended that the CJEU dismiss the European Commission’s infringement action concerning Luxembourg’s implementation of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) interest limitation rule (case C-138/24).
Article 4(7) of the ATAD provides that Member States can exclude certain ‘financial undertakings’ from the scope of the interest deduction limitation rules3. The Directive defines financial undertakings by reference to a closed list included in Article 2(5) of the ATAD. Securitization companies regulated under the EU Securitization Regulation are not included in that list. However, Luxembourgish legislation contains a derogation for securitization special purpose vehicles.
In July 2023, the European Commission (the EC or the Commission) announced its decision to refer Luxembourg to the CJEU for failing to correctly transpose the interest limitation rules under the ATAD. In its referral, the EC asked the CJEU to declare that Luxembourg has failed to fulfil its obligations under the ATAD and to order it to pay the costs. For previous coverage, please refer to E-News Issue 193.
AG Kokott started the analysis of the case by recalling that, in order to determine the scope of the transposition obligation and the margin of discretion available to Member States, it is necessary to interpret the ATAD provisions relating to ‘financial undertakings’ in light of their wording, overall scheme, objectives and legislative background. The AG acknowledged that, as regards legislative technique, Article 2(5) of the ATAD appears to provide an exhaustive list of entities that qualify as financial undertakings for the purpose of the Directive. The AG further noted that the ATAD does not contain an explicit residual clause that would allow Member States to expand that list by introducing additional categories of entities, such as securitization companies. Moreover, in the AG’s view, the spirit and purpose of the ATAD – including that of ensuring a common minimum level of protection against tax avoidance across the EU, also supports a restrictive interpretation of the provision. Nevertheless, the AG noted that the spirit and purpose of the derogation provisions included in Article 4 (interest limitation rules) and Article 7 (controlled foreign company) of the ATAD support instead a broader reading of the term ‘financial undertaking’.
AG Kokott then noted that – in line with the general rule of interpretation, Article 2(5) ATAD must be interpreted, as far as possible, in a manner that preserves its validity. Accordingly, this provision must be interpreted in conformity with the entirety of primary EU law, including the principle of equal treatment set out in Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Under settled CJEU case-law, the principle requires that comparable situations are not treated differently and that different situations are not treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified. In the view of the AG, securitization companies exhibit ‘specific characteristics’ comparable to those of ‘financial undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 2(5) ATAD. Apart from detailed differences, the usual activity of such entities relates to borrowed capital, interest and certain categories of income. In addition, since 2018, securitization vehicles have been subject to specific EU level regulation under Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 (Securitization Regulation). In the AG’s view, such entities are therefore no more prone to the types of abusive tax arrangements that Article 4 and Article 7 of the ATAD seek to prevent than the financial and insurance undertakings that are listed in Article 2(5) ATAD and that benefit from the exception. However, in the absence of an update to the list of entities benefiting from the exception to include them, securitization vehicles are subject to the interest limitation rule and the CFC rule. In the AG’s view this amounts to unequal treatment.
The AG considered that the Commission did not demonstrate a specific and proportionate reason why securitization entities should be treated more restrictively than other regulated financial undertakings. The AG essentially stressed that the Commission’s reliance on the allegedly higher risk and complexity of securitization is unfounded, because these risks are precisely addressed by the Securitization Regulation and comparable to those of other regulated financial products.
In light of these considerations, AG Kokott proposed that the Court should dismiss the Commission’s action.
For previous coverage, please refer to E-News Issue 193.